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THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF LAW
Gary Pellert
I Thould say at the outset that I expected to be arguing about
some of the fundamental substantive issues separating the Right
and the Left in contemporary legal thought. In particular, I thought
that Professor Epstein would defend the notion of a sharp distinc-
tion between individual economic liberty and public regulatory
power suggested by his recent Takings I book and by tonight's theme
of "Classical Law."
If I correctly understand his talk, however, he has abandoned
the attempt to portray market-oriented legal ideology as something
implied in the very idea of liberty or freedom or the rule of law; I
agree with him that the image of a classical common law that is (or
was) neutral, objective, and determinate is, quite simply, analytically
incoherent. The notion of a return to such a regime is a fantasy
because such a regime never existed.
The loss of faith in the ability to present the "free market" as
the model for legal decisionmaking is a significant event in our polit-
ical and intellectual history; it is also a particular challenge to con-
servative, market-oriented legal theory. Legal theorists on the Right
have traditionally presented the hierarchies of our social lives as in-
fused with a transcendant logic or necessity, as if the existing distri-
bution of wealth, power, and prestige either directly reflected an
underlying meritocracy of equal opportunity and just desserts, or
indirectly would achieve a kind of utilitarian justice in the long run.
Either way, the notion has always been that there was something
qualitatively different between economic liberty and social regula-
tion, between private freedom and public power.
What we have been calling "classical law" played a foundational
role in this idea that something called a "private market" was, or
could be, a neutral, impersonal mediator of social relations. In the
classical law imagery, as described by Professor Barry, the common
law rules of tort, contract, and property were supposed to provide
the neutral, objective framework within which individuals could pur-
sue their own, self-defined ends free from social coercion. So long
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as the classical law image was plausible, right-wing legal theorists
like Hayek could present their program as embodied in the impartial
dictates of freedom. Thus, in the rhetoric of, say, Hayek, free mar-
ket capitalism is implied in the very idea of the rule of law; economic
regulation is not simply bad policy-it is downright inconsistent
with having a society ruled by law at all. That is why, I guess, there
is a resurgence of interest in classical law among today's conserva-
tive legal scholars; the framework of classical law theory promises
advocates of right-wing social policy a way to present their programs
as the result of a commitment to rational, neutral law as opposed to
ideology and politics. But, as Professor Epstein suggested, the re-
turn to classical law is a dead-end.
I want to focus tonight on two issues. First, I want to explore
with you why the traditional notion of a sharp distinction between
the public and private realms as the basis for distinguishing law and
politics, or law and legislation, is no longer considered respectable
in American intellectual life; this analysis simply reviews the critique
of market ideology that the legal realists taught us.
Second, it seems to me insufficient merely to point out the ana-
lytic flaws of the classical law approach. The more important task is
to understand how people could in fact believe that the classical
world-view was neutral and self-evident. To get at this aspect of
classical law, we need to consider how classical legal thought worked
in the world as a social ideology-that is, how the classical world-
view represented the world through particular images and meta-
phors for perceiving and talking about society. This grid of inter-
pretation was not simply a "theory" in the sense of an intellectual
project; it was also a justification for and an ideology of power
through which actual, real-world relationships of economic and so-
cial domination between workers and owners, landlords and ten-
ants, men and women, were translated, not as the exercise of social
power, but instead as free and consensual individual choices.
First, the analytic critique. Here I will take the Lochner era as
roughly representative of the classical law tradition. Now, in the
modern legal context, Lochner is routinely criticized because the
Court is supposed to have imposed its own values in its reading of
the Constitution. But this reaction to Lochner presupposes the de-
cline in the belief in the neutrality of classical common law doctrine.
That is, it is possible to say that the Court was imposing its own
biases in its protection of the "liberty of contract" between em-
ployer and employee precisely because it is no longer plausible to
believe that the market organized through the common law was neu-
tral and value-free, and therefore the Court's protection of that
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realm from legislative intervention also could not be neutral and
value-free.
To mainstream lawyers of the Lochner era, however, the Court's
protection of the liberty of contract was not necessarily a value ques-
tion at all; instead, Lochner could be seen as the constitutional mani-
festation of a broader, integrated view of law very closely
resembling Professor Barry's description of the classical theory of
law. From this perspective, the judiciary was merely performing at
the constitutional level the same tasks that it carried out at the com-
mon law level-the protection of private, individual choice, or, more
generally, the protection of the private realm from public interfer-
ence. Accordingly, the judiciary at common law enforced contracts
that were the freely-willed result of bargaining between competent
parties; it refused to enforce contracts that were the product of du-
ress or fraud, because in such circumstances the private choices of
individuals were tainted by external interference. When this im-
agery of what law was about was transferred to the constitutional
level, it meant that, just as the judiciary would protect the free
choice of parties through the rules on duress and fraud at the com-
mon law level, so at the constitutional level the judiciary would pro-
tect the free choice of individuals from interference by others more
generally, these others represented by the State.
There was this deep metaphoric connection between the com-
mon law and constitutional law, a grand integration of public and
private law within which legislative interference with the liberty of
contract very closely resembled interference with the free choice of
a contracting party through the infliction of duress or fraud; just as
the judiciary refused to enforce a contract that was the result of du-
ress or fraud because in such circumstances the basis for enforce-
ment, the free choice of an individual, was absent, so also the
judiciary would refuse to enforce legislation that invaded this pri-
vate realm of free choice. And accordingly, in breathtaking symme-
try, the logic of the common law also governed the logic of
constitutional law-the permissable range of legislative regulation
roughly corresponded to the realm in which the common law itself
recognized an absence of free choice. Hence, the legislature could
regulate and forbid bargaining practices that the common law would
recognize as fraud or duress; the legislature could not go beyond
those limits in regulation because, by definition, if the common law
would enforce a particular transaction, it was the result of free
choice and therefore simultaneously immune from legislative
interference.
This is how the classical law theory can end up with the fairly
odd-sounding institutional premises that Professor Barry advocated.
[Vol. 73:300
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In this vision, the legislature threatens liberty because it represents
the possibility of collective power, rather than individual choice, de-
termining social relations. The judiciary, on the other hand, does
not threaten liberty because it simply facilitates the achievement of
individual desire. Public law is legitimate in this scheme only when
it is truly neutral to private individuals; public law is illegitimate
when it is overtaken by interest-groups pursuing rent-seeking legis-
lation because then the government would be taking sides in the
private market and thus acting in a regulatory rather than facilitative
fashion. Of course, public law is necessary to achieve the "public
goods" that the market is structurally unable to produce, but it must
be restricted to this fairly narrow role lest the public realm invade
the private realm, replacing freedom with coercion. Similarly, in the
mainstream political economy of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, the relationship between the private and public spheres was
also conceived on the contractual model-free, private individuals
come together and out of the necessity to get public goods create
the public realm in a broad social contract, but that contract limits
the State to the public realm; legislative interference with liberty of
contract, the core of the private realm, is illegitimate because it is
not grounded in the free choice of individuals; it amounts to a
breach of this original, imaginary social contract.
We can see the enormous weight put on the notion of individ-
ual free choice in the classical law approach. Both the common law
and constitutional law referred back to an initial, foundational image
that in a contract between competent parties, individuals freely de-
termined their own fates and therefore the classical common law
rules and the corresponding limits on legislation were legitimate be-
cause they were implied in the very idea of freedom under law.
Both the contours of the private realm and the cbintours of the pub-
lic realm were legitimated by reference to the free choice of individ-
uals determining their particular social relations in contracts and
agreeing to a broad social contract in public law. Thus, public
power was legitimate to the extent that it was taken as derivative of
private consent. On this world-view, the inequality of bargaining
power between contracting parties could not impugn the consent
grounding contract because inequality of bargaining power itself, as
the Coppage2 Court asserted, was a result of freedom to contract as
one saw fit.
Now it is possible to object to this approach on external
grounds-that is, through a basic disagreement with the individual-
ist model on which the classical approach rests. One might initially
2 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914).
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disagree with the founding ontology governing the reigning distinc-
tion between the public and private realms. Rather than imagining
that we begin in the world as private beings, as discreet, atomistic
individuals with particular desires and talents that are part of us as
individuals, exogenous to the social world in which we find our-
selves, and that group life is threatening and coercive to our per-
sonal identity, we could begin with the competing ontology of
community, that is, the idea that we are not in any meaningful sense
discreet, unconnected individuals, but are interdependent and inevi-
tably connected to one another, that we need and desire fulfillment
outside ourselves, with others in group life, and that even our per-
sonal identity and meaning depend on our connections as members
of a community. The possibility of this alternative ontology for im-
agining the relationship between individuals and groups impugns
the first premises of the classical world-view because it calls into
question the self-evident character of the main problematic of the
classical approach-the premise that there is a fundamental and
qualitative distinction between the individual and the group, the pri-
vate and the public, and that the job of law is to mediate the conflict
between the two realms.
I have called this objection to the classical approach "external"
because it challenges the first premise of classical law as itself a con-
troversial value choice; it amounts to saying that one can understand
the coherence of market ideology, but disagree that individualist as
opposed to communal premises should govern social life. Or that
other values, such as security, must necessarily compete with the
classical value of freedom and, indeed, even within the classical
structure, the recognition of duties to others reflected in the compe-
tency, fraud, and duress rules of contract, and in torts generally.
This objection to the starting-point of classical law is important be-
cause it refutes the classical pretensions to neutrality by finding a
controversial value choice at the core of the whole classical ap-
proach. I will return to the issue of the classical image of the rela-
tionship between individuals and groups later; now I want to move
on to what I consider the more telling objections to the classical
approach made by the legal realists.
The legal realist analytic is an "internal" critique of classical law
to the extent that the realists demonstrated that, even if one were to
accept the individualist premises of the classical approach, there was
no neutral, coherent basis for implementing the program in legal
doctrine. Instead, the realists demonstrated that the issue was not,
and cannot be, the choice between a free market and public regula-
tion, or between the competing values of freedom and security, be-
cause the very concept of a neutral common law regime of private
304 [Vol. 73:300
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law is analytically flawed. There is, simply, no such thing as a free
market at all. The classical image of a realm of private free choice
was false because, as soon as a legal regime was in place, there could
be no such thing as a private sphere of civil society separate from
public, social power. The classical distinction between the private
common law and public legislation was, in a word, incoherent.
Now, there were various levels in which this critique was
worked out, and if you are interested in seeing it explicated fairly
fully, the best contemporary piece I know of on this is Duncan Ken-
nedy's and Frank Michelman's article, Are Contract and Property Effi-
cient?3 Let me now just trace the outlines of the critique and draw
out the significance for the theory of classical law.
One angle pursued by the realists was to demonstrate that the
distinction between free will and duress upon which legitimacy of
the classical approach rested was itself a political decision, a social
construct. For example (I am thinking of Robert Hale's work here)
in the paradigm private law field of contract, the so-called consent
to a contract was actually conditioned on something external to the
contracting parties, the bargaining power created by the legal pro-
tection of property rights. If an employee wants to eat, and the
property rules have been structured so that all the available food in
the community is owned by someone, and all the available means of
production are privately owned, then the employee is coerced into
agreeing to some employer's contractual terms. And this coercion
is rooted in the legal decisions about what interests to protect as
property and what interests not to protect. In the classical imagery,
the employment contract should be enforced because it is the result
of a private, unregulated decision between two competent parties.
The realists showed that the consent to the contract was the result
of social power embodied in the property rules, and there was no
neutral way to justify the property rules themselves as pre-social or
natural. When the common law judges thought they were simply
ratifying individual free will in private law, they were really ratifying
the exercise of will in the broader context of social power, the ex-
isting matrix for the distribution of privileges and entitlements, in-
cluding property rights and entitlements to be free from harm or
privileges to inflict harm. As Holfeld taught us, any distribution of
entitlements creates power in some people and loss of power in
other people. There is nothing particularly natural or self-evident
about any particular scheme for making this kind of distribution of
legally protected interests; it could be structured completely differ-
ently, so that others would be benefited and burdened.
3 Kennedy & Michelman, Are Contract and Property Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711
(1980).
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The classical argument that inequality of bargaining power
could not justify regulation of the employment relationship because
such inequality was the result of free choice, the result of a free mar-
ket, could then be turned completely inside out-since inequality of
bargaining power necessarily influenced consent, and bargaining
power is the result of the law's distribution of entitlements, there
could be no private realm of consent free from the influence of so-
cial power, and therefore nothing outside the legal categories them-
selves determined what would be called public or private, free or
coerced, an entitlement to security or a privilege to harm.
Conceptually, the realists demonstrated, the classicals had it
wrong-private individual free will did not precede social power;
rather, social power, reflected in the property rules by which some
were wealthy and some impoverished, preceded and determined,
contractual consent. The public precedes the private; there is no
way to use private contractual consent to legitimate as neutral and
"legal" the common law of contracts because consent is itself deriv-
ative of a prior public power reflected in the decisions of what inter-
ests to protect as property and what interests to refuse to protect.
In the fundamental contradiction referred to by Professor Epstein,
there is no natural, pre-social way to distinguish and apply the free
market principles favoring the protection of private property and
the principles favoring open competition since competition by defi-
nition causes harm and insecurity to existing property. The upshot
of this strand of realist argument was that it is a political decision
what to call free will and what to call coercion, what to protect as
property and what to privilege as freedom. The classical common
law could not be justified as a protection of the free market because
what was called freedom as opposed to coercion was itself a function
of the legal rules.
A similar point applies to the fraud rules. It is conceptually
possible to conceive of either broad or narrow disclosure duties;
narrow disclosure rules would burden some and benefit others;
broad disclosure duties would benefit different groups and burden
other groups. But nothing in the concept of contract or a free mar-
ket can tell you which to choose. Rather than simply reflecting and
facilitating pre-existing private decisions, the constituent common
law market rules actually constituted and regulated what would
count as legitimate and illegitimate market power. The classical pri-
vate realm was, in short, the construct of the public power reflected
in the choice of whether to recognize broad or narrow duress rules,
or broad or narrow fraud rules. Most importantly, the distribution
of wealth was not a result of the private free market, but the result of
social power reflected in decisions as to what to protect as property,
[Vol. 73:300306
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what to define as free will or duress, and what range of other-re-
garding duties to recognize in contract, tort, and property law. The
issue could not be a principled distinction between the free market
and the social welfare state because the free market was transcen-
dental nonsense; the distinction between a private, unregulated
market and public intervention was false, because the particular
structure of the private common law was itself, necessarily, a form of
public regulation. If what scares classical liberals about the govern-
ment is the idea that the State represents the threat of social power,
the realists showed that there is no escape from social power.
If you are with me this far, the next question is why did not the
classical law proponents see the analytic flaws of their justificatory
theories? Now here is where the realists stopped short in their chal-
lenge to the old order. The realists tended to treat the classical
world-view as a mere intellectual error, as a mistake in a train of
reasoning, rather than as playing a critical role in the construction of
social life, rather than as an ideology that spiritualized the status
quo power relations by translating them as a meritocracy of freedom
and liberty under law. The realists neglected to talk about the way
that the classical ideology worked in the social world, to tell workers
in the sweatshops that they had consented to their working condi-
tions and to their own exploitation, to tell the wealthy that their eco-
nomic power was earned, deserved, and legitimate. Instead, the
realist explanation was "formalism"-the classical theorists mistak-
enly thought that they could move from the abstract ideas of liberty,
of contract, and of property, to concrete doctrinal manifestations,
such that contract would mean, for example, the particular rules of
offer and acceptance, consideration, the distinctions between free
will and duress, the limitations on principles of fraud and misrepre-
sentation, and the contours of expectation damages, as if the idea of
having a contract regime answered all these subsidiary doctrinal
questions for you. The formalist mistake was to assume that you
could move from the abstract idea to the particular concrete context
without the intervention of social power, of policy or the whim of
the judge or the apparent social consensus or something like that.
Without that moment of formalism, that old kind of Aristotelian
classificatory belief that the categories of public discourse could
somehow magically match up with the categories of independent,
pre-public material life, without that kind of intellectual error to ex-
plain themselves, the classical system appears simply as an ideology
of power rationalizing the apartheid of class and wealth, the ex-
ploitation of workers in the factories of turn of the century America,
by the propagation of the myth of economic meritocracy in the free
market.
3071988]
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Let me be clearer. I am not talking here about classical law as
an abstract theory concerned with the source of law, or with whether
law has an author or not. I am talking about law as social ideology,
as a matrix for translating social experience, and specifically how the
classical approach translates actual people's lives on assembly lines,
in bread lines, on street corners, in interviews, in families, and
across the "private" realm as free and consensual, as devoid of pub-
lic power. The image that when we are in the private realm, as de-
fined by classical law, we are free is a false image; it was false when it
presented the economic relations of the early twentieth century as
free, and it is false today when it presents women's roles in the "pri-
vate" realm of homelife, workplace, families, and sexuality as a re-
sult of private, free choice. It is a lie that represses all the ways that
our "private" relations are socially constructed, through the ideol-
ogy of gender roles, of sexuality, and through the material distribu-
tion of power and privilege.
The point here is that there is more to the flaws of the classical
approach than some intellectual error. The problem with the classi-
cal approach is not that there is some mistake in the chain of reason-
ing that could be corrected by the substitution, as Professor Epstein
suggests, of utilitarian for natural law premises; rather, the repre-
sentation of the world according to the classical imagery is an ideol-
ogy which plays a social role in legitimating as natural or necessary
the rank caste structure of our social life.
The problem with classical law is not formalism, because the
mistakes of the classical approach are not epistemological mistakes
in the theory of knowledge, mistaking mental categories for catego-
ries of material existence. They are rather pieces of social mythol-
ogy and ideology that play particular social roles in relations
between people. In other words, the problem of the public/private
distinction is not simply that it is indefensible after taking seriously
the work of realists like Pound and Hale and Felix Cohen; the prob-
lem is that it is a false and inauthentic representation of our lives as
sharply divided by on the one hand a private realm where we are
truly ourselves, somewhere, at home, or in total isolation from
others and their influence, and on the other hand, another realm
where we are not ourselves, where we have to play publicly-imposed
roles, where we are somehow coerced, putting on masks and playing
out roles that appear to have no social agency. This classical catego-
rization of the social world seems to me simultaneously to be the
very definition of social alienation-the sense that it is normal to
believe that we do not collectively create both ourselves as individu-
als and our social roles, that we are either alone and free from social
influence or with others but robbed of our subjective identify.
[Vol. 73:300308
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The myth structure of classical law ideology plays a particular
political role, by translating as free and normal the social alienation
and pbwerlessness people feel at work and in their public lives gen-
erally. If we believe this mythology, that the social roles we play as
teachers and students, as managers and workers, and as men and
women, are either public and therefore coercive but necessary, or
private, and therefore simply the result of individual free choice,
then we do not see them as open to social change, by us working
together imagining new, more fulfilling ways to be together. In
short, the classical ideology is the message that we are powerless to
change the world together, to recover the sense in social life that we
can create and recreate the world in which we live.
